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THE AFRICAN UNION CONVENTION
ON CYBERSECURITY: A REGIONAL RESPONSE
TOWARDS CYBER STABILITY?
by
UCHENNA JEROME ORJI*
Following the liberalization of telecommunication markets  in African States,  and
the increasing  availability  of wireless  technologies  and  broadband  capacity,
the levels of Internet penetration and ICT access in Africa has continued to grow
in a phenomenal manner since the beginning of the new millennium. Internet use
statistics indicate that Africa’s Internet user population grew from about four and
a half  million  people  in 2000 to about  400 million  people  in December,  2017.
However, widespread ICT access and Internet penetration in Africa has also raised
concerns  over  the need  to promote  cybersecurity  governance  and cyber  stability
across  the continent.  This  prompted  the African  Union  to establish  a regional
cybersecurity treaty,  known as the African Union Convention on Cyber Security
and Personal Data Protection, in June, 2014. The Convention imposes obligations
on Member  States  to establish  legal,  policy  and regulatory  measures  to promote
cybersecurity governance and control cybercrime. This article analyzes the nature
and scope of the cybersecurity governance obligations under the Convention and
examines  how  the adoption  of the Convention  can  promote  cyber  stability
in the African region. In so doing, the paper also examines the challenges impeding
the application  of the Convention  as a framework  for  promoting  regional  cyber
stability in Africa. The paper identifies the slow pace of Member State ratification
and the absence of effective regional coordination as some of the major reasons why
the Convention  has  not  been  effectively  applied  as a framework  for  promoting
regional  cyber  stability.  Therefore,  the paper  makes  a case  for  the establishment
of a regional  monitoring  mechanism  within  the AU  framework  to improve
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the regional  harmonization of cybersecurity governance frameworks,  and harness
the application  of the Convention  as a framework  for  promoting  regional  cyber
stability.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the African continent has continued
to witness  a tremendous  growth  in ICT  and  Internet  penetration.  Recent
Internet use statistics indicate that Africa’s Internet user population grew
from  about  4.515 million  people  in 2000  to 453.3 million  people
in December,  2017,  representing  approximately  35.2 percent  of Africa’s
entire population estimate.1 This phenomenal growth, which still continues
into  the future,2 has  been  linked  to factors  such  as the liberalization
of telecommunications  markets  in African  States,  the widespread
proliferation of mobile telecommunication technologies, and the increasing
availability  of broadband  capacity.3 However,  the spread  of ICTs  and
Internet  penetration  in Africa  has  also  raised  concerns  over  the need
to promote  cybersecurity  governance  and cyber  stability  in the continent.
This need prompted the African Union to establish a regional cybersecurity
treaty known as the African Union (AU) Convention on Cyber Security and
Personal  Data  Protection,  in June,  2014.4 The Convention  imposes
obligations  on Member  States  to establish  legal,  policy  and  regulatory
measures  to promote  cybersecurity  governance  and  control  cybercrime.
This paper analyzes the nature and scope of the cybersecurity governance
obligations  under  the Convention,  and  also  examines  how  the adoption
of the Convention  can  promote  cyber  stability  in the African  region,
as well as the challenges  impeding  the application  of the Convention
as a framework for promoting regional cyber stability in Africa.
1 Miniwatts  Marketing  Group.  (2017)  Internet  Usage Statistics  for  Africa  [online]. Available
from: http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm [Accessed 6 June 2018].
2 The  GSMA (Global  System  for  Mobile  Communications  Association)  reports  that  “over
the next  five  years,  an additional  168 million people  will  be connected by mobile  services  across
Africa, reaching 725 million unique subscribers by 2020”. See GSMA. (2016) The Mobile Economy
Africa 2016. London: GSMA, p. 2.
3 See GSMA (2013) The Mobile Economy Report 2013. London: A. T. Kearney, p. 16.
4 See The African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection, 27 June, 2014
(EX.CL/846 (XXV)).
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The paper identifies the slow pace of ratification by Member States and
the absence of effective regional coordination as some of the major reasons
why the Convention  has  not  been  effectively  applied  as a framework for
promoting regional cyber stability. Accordingly, the paper makes a case for
the establishment  of a regional  monitoring  mechanism  within  the AU
framework  to improve  the regional  harmonization  of cybersecurity
governance  frameworks,  and  harness  the application  of the Convention
as a framework for promoting regional cyber stability.
The paper  comprises  seven sections.  The first section,  which  includes
this  introduction,  will  provide  a brief  overview  of the concepts
of cybersecurity  and  cyber  stability.  The second section  discusses
the development of the AU Convention on Cybersecurity. The third section
discusses the nature and scope of the cybersecurity governance obligations
under  the Convention.  The fourth section  examines  the legal  status
of the Convention  in the domestic  legal  order  of AU  Member  States.
The fifth section  examines  the prospects  of applying  the Convention
as a framework for promoting regional cyber stability in the African region,
while  the sixth section  examines  the challenges  impeding  the application
of the Convention  as a framework  for  promoting  regional  cyber  stability.
This is then followed by recommendations and the conclusion. 
1.1 DEFINING CYBERSECURITY AND CYBER STABILITY
Cybersecurity is defined as
“the collection  of tools,  policies,  guidelines,  risk  management  approaches,
actions,  training,  best  practices,  assurances  and technologies  that  can be
used  to protect  the cyber-environment  and  organization,  as well  as users’
assets”.5
Cybersecurity  governance  measures  include  technical,  organizational,
policy, and legal aspects.6 The technical aspects of cybersecurity governance
deal  with  the development  and  implementation  of technical  protection
measures  for  computer  systems  and  network  infrastructure,  while
the organizational  aspects  deal  with  the development  of institutional
capacities  to promote  cybersecurity,  such  as the establishment  of law
5 See ITU High Level Experts Group (2008) ITU Global Cyber-Security Agenda (GCA) High Level
Experts  Group  [HLEG]  Global  Strategic  Report. Geneva:  ITU,  p. 27.  See  Orji,  U.  J.  (2012)
Cybersecurity Law and Regulation, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, pp. 10–16.
6 Id. at pp. 17–42.
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enforcement  organizations  as well  as the development of institutional
capacities  including  the establishment  of Computer  Emergency  Response
Teams  (CERTs)  to provide  critical  services  such  as prevention  and  early
warning, detection and management of cybersecurity incidents. The policy
and legal  aspects  of cybersecurity  governance deal  with policy  and legal
measures  that  aim  to promote  cybersecurity.  Legal  measures  are  usually
considered  as probably  the most  relevant  aspect  of cybercrime  control.7
Such measures include the establishment of laws which prohibit  acts that
violate the security or integrity or availability of computer data and systems
or networks and attacks against critical  information infrastructure. It  also
includes  legal  measures  to facilitate  cross-border  cooperation
on cybersecurity,  including  the prevention,  investigation  and prosecution
of prohibited acts. 
On the other hand, the concept of “cyber stability” has been defined as
“a geostrategic  condition  whereby  users  of the cyber  domain  enjoy
the greatest  possible  benefits  to political,  civic,  social,  and  economic  life,
while preventing and managing conduct that may undermine those benefits
at the national, regional, and international levels”.8 
It  has  been  observed  that  this  definition  creates  a basis  from  which
to identify when stability is the goal and also to discern what is potentially
relevant,  useful,  and  strategic  information  about  activity  in the cyber
domain  from  what  is  not.9 However,  cyber  stability  is  also  regarded
an emerging  concept  that  has  not  yet  been  developed  as an analytic
category.10 Basically,  the concept  of cyber  stability  aims  to promote
the exercise  of State  responsibilities  to address  the security  challenges
of the information  society.  This  particularly  requires  States  to establish
appropriate  legal,  policy  and regulatory  measures  to protect  cyber  users
and cyber infrastructure within their jurisdiction, and also ensure that cyber
activities which are conducted within their jurisdiction do not cause harm
to other  individuals  or infrastructure  in another  jurisdiction.  Thus,
the concept of cyber stability requires that States will establish cybersecurity
7 See  Marco, G. (2009)  Understanding  Cybercrime:  A Guide for Developing Countries.  Geneva:
ITU, p. 84. 
8 See Rudnick, L.  et al. (2015)  Towards Cyber Stability: A User-Centered Tool for Policy Makers.
Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, p. 7.
9 Id.
10 Id.
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governance measures including criminal laws such as cybercrime laws and
regulations  for  the purpose  of deterring  persons  within  their  jurisdiction
from engaging in malicious cyber activities  that  will  cause  harm to other
individuals  or infrastructure  in another  jurisdiction.  Apparently,  the need
to promote cyber stability arises from the increasing the interconnectedness
of national  information  communication  networks  in different  countries
which  has  ushered  in an age  of network  interdependence  where
the security  of each  country’s  network  is  also  dependent  on the actions
of State  and  non-State  actors  around  the world.  Therefore,  the concept
of cyber stability requires States to maintain governance responsibility over
cyber  activities  on their  territory,  and  thus  it  enshrines  elements
of the international  principles  of trans-boundary  harm  and  State
responsibility. These principles have been recognized in different contexts
in the Corfu  Channel  Case,  where  the International  Court  of Justice  (ICJ)
held that a State may not 
“allow  knowingly  its  territory  to be  used  for  acts  contrary  to the rights
of other States”,11
and in the Trail Smelter Case, where it was held that
“no  State  has  a right  to use  or permit  the use  of its  territory  in such
a manner  as to cause  injury  […]  in or to the territory  of another
or the properties or persons therein”.12
2. THE AFRICAN UNION AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE CONVENTION CYBERSECURITY
The African Union (AU) is an intergovernmental regional body that unites
sovereign  States  within  the entire  African  continent.13 The AU  was
established  in 2001  to replace  the Organization  of African  Unity14 and  its
headquarters  is  located  in Addis  Ababa,  Ethiopia.  Currently,  the AU
comprises 55 sovereign African States.15 The aims of the AU include  inter
alia to “accelerate  the political  and  socio-economic  integration” of the African
11 See The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) (1949) ICJ Reports 4, at paragraph 22.
12 See  The Trail Smelter Arbitration Case (United States of America v. Canada)  (1938) 3 R.I.A.A.
1905.  See Editorial,  (1941)  The Trail  Smelter  Arbitral  Decision.  American  Journal
of International Law, 35, p. 684.
13 See  The African  Union  (AU)  [online]  Available  from:  http://www.au.int/en/  [Accessed
6 June 2018].
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continent;16 to promote  economic  development  and  “the integration
of African economies”,17 and to 
“coordinate  and  harmonize  the policies  between  the existing  and  future
regional economic communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives
of the Union”.18 
These mandates which are enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU
create broad legal basis for the AU and its institutions to establish regional
policy  and  regulatory  regimes  on issues  that  affect  Africa’s  economic
integration  and  development,  such  as telecommunications/ICTs  and
cybersecurity  governance.19 However,  the AU  did  not  commence
the development of concrete regulatory initiatives cybersecurity until after
2008.20 A major factor that might have impeded the development of regional
cybersecurity  initiatives  can  be  traced  to the low  penetration  of ICTs
in Africa prior to the widespread availability of wireless technologies within
the first  decade  of the 21st century.  One  of the AU’s  first  statements
on the need  to promote  cybersecurity  is  found  in the AU  Draft  Report
on a Study  of the Harmonization  of Telecommunication,  and  Information
Communication  Technology  Policies  and  Regulation  (2008).21 The Report
emphasized the need for the establishment of a harmonized regional policy
14 The AU was originally established as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) by the OAU
Charter  on 25 May, 1963  in Addis  Abba,  Ethiopia.  However,  on the September  1999,
the Heads of States  of the OAU issued a Declaration (The Sirte  Declaration)  which called
for the establishment  of an African  Union  to accelerate  the process  of integration  within
the African continent with a view to enhancing Africa’s role in the global economy and also
addressing  Africa’s  social,  economic  and  political  problems.  Subsequently,  the AU  was
established on 26 May,  2001 in Addis Abba and launched on 9 July, 2002 in South Africa
to replace the OAU. See African Union (2017) African Union in a Nutshell. [online] Available
from: http://www.au.int/en/abut/nutshell [Accessed 6 June 2018].
15 See African  Union  (2017)  Member  States.  [online]  African  Union.  Available  from:
http://www.au.int/en/member_states/country profiles [Accessed 6 June 2018].
16 See  Article  3(c)  Constitutive  Act  of  the  AU.  Togo:  The  Thirty-sixth  Ordinary  Session
of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. In English.
17 See Article 3(j) id.
18 See Article 3(i) id.
19 See Orji, U. J. (2018) International Telecommunications Law and Policy. United Kingdom:
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, p. 240.
20 For example,  in Europe  issues  relating  to cybersecurity  have  been  on the Council
of Europe’s agenda since 1976. See Council of Europe (1976) Twentieth Conference of Directors
of Criminological Research Institutes: Criminological Aspects of Economic Crime. Strasbourg. See
Schjolberg, S. (2008)  The History of Global Harmonization on Cybercrime Legislation – The Road
to Geneva,  p. 2.  [online]  Available  from:  http://www.cybercrime
law.net/documents/cybercrime_history.pdf [Accessed 6 June 2018].
21 See African Union (2008) Study on the Harmonization of Telecommunication and Information and
Communication  Technologies  Policies  and  Regulation  in Africa:  Draft  Report.  Addis  Ababa,
Ethiopia: African Union.
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and  regulatory  framework  on cybersecurity.22 Subsequently,
on 5 November, 2009,  the AU Ministers in Charge of Communication and
Information  Technologies  convened  an Extraordinary  Session
in Johannesburg,  South  Africa,  where  they  adopted  a set  of declarations
known as the Oliver Tambo Declaration.23 The Declaration directed the AU
to 
“jointly develop with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(UNECA),  under  the framework  of the African  Information  Society
Initiative, a Convention on cyber legislation based on the continent’s needs
and  which  adheres  to the legal  and  regulatory  requirements  on electronic
transactions, cybersecurity, and personal data protection”.24 
The Declaration further recommended that  AU Member States should
adopt the proposed Convention by 2012.25
In 2011,  the efforts  of the AU  and  UNECA  led  to the development
of the Draft  Convention  for  the Establishment  of a Credible  Legal
Framework for Cybersecurity in Africa.26 The Draft Convention was meant
to harmonize  the laws  of African  States  on electronic  commerce,  data
protection, cybersecurity governance and cybercrime control. Later, in June,
2012,  the AU  Expert  Group  on Cybersecurity  (comprising  experts  from
Member States and Regional Economic Communities in Eastern, Southern
and Northern Africa) met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to consider the Draft
Convention.27 The Draft  Convention  was  subsequently  adopted
in September, 2012, by the AU Expert Group on Cybersecurity.28 This was
also followed by its approval during the 22nd Ordinary Session of the AU
Executive  Council  in January,  2013.  After  that,  the Draft  Convention was
to be presented for legal validation by the AU Justice Ministers Conference
22 See African Union (2008) n. 21, p. 75. 
23 See  Extra-Ordinary Conference of African Union Ministers in Charge of Communication
and Information Technologies (2009) Oliver Tambo Declaration. Johannesburg, South Africa:
African Union. 
24 Id. p. 4. 
25 Id.
26 See  Draft  African  Union  (AU)  Convention  on the Establishment  of a Credible  Legal
Framework for Cybersecurity in Africa, AU Draft0 010111, Version 01/01.2011. 
27 See Economic  Commission  for Africa  (June  2012) Declaration  of Addis  Ababa
on the Harmonization  of Cyber  Legislation  in Africa.  Addis  Ababa:  Economic  Commission
for Africa, paragraph 10, p. 2.
28 See United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) Press Release, Draft African
Union  Convention  on Cybersecurity  Comes  to  its  Final  Stage.  [online]  Available  from:
http://www1.uneca.org/TabId/3018/Default. aspx?ArticleId=1931 [Accessed 6 June 2018].
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in October,  2013,29 after  which  it  was  also  to be  presented  for  adoption
by the AU  Summit  in January,  2014  and  then  open  for  signatures  and
ratification  by AU Member  States.  However,  the Draft  Convention  could
not  be  presented  to the AU  for  adoption  in January,  2014,  as a result
of technical delays,30 and also due to opposition from civil  society groups
and  the academia.31 There  were  also  concerns  that  the Convention  was
drafted  without  a wide  consultation  of relevant  stakeholders  in Member
States,32 and  lacked  critical  cybersecurity  governance  mechanisms
to facilitate  effective  legal  harmonization  and  international  cooperation.33
A revised  version  of the Draft  Convention  was  later  adopted  on 27 June,
2014, by the AU Heads of State and Government during the 23rd Ordinary
Session of the AU Assembly in Malabo.34
The Convention is known as the AU Convention on Cyber Security and
Personal  Data  Protection35 and  basically  aims  to harmonize  the laws
of African  States  on electronic  commerce,  data  protection,  cybersecurity
governance  and  cybercrime  control.  The Convention  also  defines
the objectives for the information society in Africa and seeks to strengthen
existing  ICT  laws  in Member  States  and  the Regional  Economic
29 See  ECA  Press  Release  (2012)  ICT  Ministers  call  for harmonized  policies  and  cyber
legislations on Cybersecurity. [online] Available from: http://www1.uneca.org/ArticleDetail
/tabid/3018/ArticleId/1934/ICT-Ministers-call-for-harmonized-policies-and-cyberlegislations
-on-Cybersecurity.aspx [Accessed 6 June 2018].
30 See Rosewarne, C. and Odunfa, A. (2014)  The 2014 Nigerian Cyber Threat Barometer Report.
South Africa and Nigeria: Wolfpack Information Risk and Digital Jewels, p. 40.
31 See Van Zyl, G. (2014) Adoption of ‘flawed’ AU Cybersecurity Convention Postponed.  IT
Web  Africa.  [online]  Available  from:  http://www.itwebafrica.com/ict-and-governance/523-
africa/232273-adoption-of-flawed-au-cybersecurity-convention-postponed [Accessed 6 June
2018].
32 See Open Forum to discuss the proposed legal framework for cybersecurity in Africa, (26 July 2013)
[online] Available from: http://daucc.wordpress.com/2013/07/26/event-panel-discussion-on-
the-draft-african-union-cyber-security-convention/#comment-4 [Accessed 6 June 2018].
33 See Orji,  U.  J.  (2012)  A Discourse  on the Perceived  Defects  of the Draft  African  Union
Convention  on the Establishment  of a Credible  Legal  Framework  for  Cybersecurity.
Communications  Law:  The Journal  of Computer,  Media  and  Telecommunications  Law,  vol. 17,
no. 4, pp. 128–130.
34 For a history of the development of AU Convention on Cybersecurity  and Personal  Data
Protection, see Orji, U. J. (2014) Examining Missing Governance Mechanisms in the African
Union Convention on Cybersecurity  and Personal Data Protection.  Computer Law Review
International,  Issue  5,  pp. 129–135; Orji,  U. J.  (2015)  Multilateral  Legal  Responses
to Cybersecurity in Africa: Any Hope for Effective International Cooperation? In Maybaum,
M.  et  al (eds.)  Architectures  in  Cyberspace –  7th International  Conference  on Cyber  Conflict.
Tallinn, Estonia: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence, pp. 105–118; Orji,
U. J.  (2012)  A Discourse  on the Perceived Defects  of the Draft  African  Union Convention
on the Establishment  of a Credible  Legal  Framework  for  Cybersecurity.  Communications
Law: The Journal ofComputer, Media and Telecommunications Law, 17 (4), pp. 128–130.
35 See  African Union  Convention  on Cyber  Security  and  Personal  Data  Protection,  27 June 2014
(EX.CL/846(XXV)) (hereafter, AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection).
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Communities  (RECs).36 With  respect  to cybersecurity  governance  and
cybercrime control, the Convention recognizes that:
“the current  state  of cybercrime  constitutes  a real  threat  to the security
of computer  networks  and  the development  of the information  society
in Africa”37
and that this state of affairs underscores the need 
“to define  broad  guidelines  of the strategy  for  the repression of cybercrime
in Member  States  of the AU,  taking  into  account  their  existing
commitments at the sub-regional, regional and international levels”.38 
Accordingly,  the Convention  adopts  a “technology  neutral”39 language
to establish  substantive  and  procedural  criminal  law  provisions  which
address cybersecurity governance and cybercrime control in AU Member
States.  Thus, aside from establishing substantive and procedural criminal
law  provisions  on cybercrime,  the Convention  also  imposes  broad
obligations  on Member  States  to establish  national  cybersecurity  policies
as well as legal,  regulatory and institutional  frameworks for cybersecurity
governance and cybercrime control. This approach apparently goes beyond
that  of the Council  of Europe  Convention  on Cybercrime40 which  mainly
requires  Member  States  to criminalize  cybercrimes  by establishing
substantive criminal law measures as well as procedural and international
cooperation mechanisms for law enforcement.41 The Convention will enter
into force after it has been ratified by 15 AU Member States.42
36 See Preamble, AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection, 2014.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 The technology neutrality principle proposes that “legislation should define the regulation to be
achieved  and  should  neither  impose,  nor  discriminate  in favour  of the use  of a particular  type
of technology  to achieve  those  objectives”.  See  European  Commission  (1999)  Towards  a New
Framework  for  Electronic  Communications  Infrastructure  and  Associated  Services. Brussels:
European  Commission,  p. 539.  See generally,  Sharpe  A.  (2009) Communications
Technologies,  Services  and  Markets.  In:  Ian  Walden  (ed.)  Telecommunications  Law  and
Regulation. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 53.
40 See The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001 (41 I.L.M. 282).
41 See  Orji,  U. J.  (2014)  Examining  Missing  Governance  Mechanisms  in the African  Union
Convention  on Cybersecurity  and  Personal  Data  Protection.  Computer  Law  Review
International, vol. 5, p. 132.
42 See Article 36 AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection.
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3. MEMBER STATE OBLIGATIONS TO IMPLEMENT 
MEASURES THAT PROMOTE CYBER STABILITY
The Convention  establishes  obligations  on Member  States  to implement
measures that will  promote cyber stability. In this regard, the Convention
requires Member States to implement obligations that include: establishing
a national  cybersecurity  framework;  promoting  a culture  of cybersecurity;
establishing national cybersecurity governance structures; protecting critical
information infrastructure; establishing cybercrime offences and procedural
measures;  and,  promoting  international  cooperation  and  legal
harmonization. These obligations are discussed below.
3.1 OBLIGATIONS TO ESTABLISH A NATIONAL 
CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK
The Convention  requires  Member  States  to promote  cyber  stability
by establishing  appropriate  cybersecurity  governance frameworks.  In this
regard,  Member  States  are  required  to establish  a national  cybersecurity
framework  that  comprises  a national  cybersecurity  policy  and  a national
cybersecurity strategy.43 A Member State’s national cybersecurity policy is
required  to recognize  the importance  of national  Critical  Information
Infrastructure  (CII),  and  identify  related  risks  using  the all-hazards
approach, while also outlining how the objectives of such policy are to be
achieved.44 The “all-hazards”  approach  to CII  protection  entails
the protection of such infrastructure from all forms of threats, whether they
originate  from  deliberate  attacks,  accidents  or natural  disasters.45
In addition,  the obligation  to establish  a national  cybersecurity  policy
requires Member States to outline how their national cybersecurity policy
will achieve the objectives of protecting national CII from identified risks. 
With  respect  to the establishment  of a national  cybersecurity  strategy,
Article 24:2  of the Convention  requires  Member  States  to adopt  strategies
they deem “appropriate and adequate” when implementing their national
cybersecurity policy, especially when undertaking initiatives such as legal
reform  and  development,  capacity  building,  public-private  partnership,
43 See Article 24 AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection, 2014.
44 See Article 24:1 id.
45 See  Gordon,  K.  and  Dion,  M.  (2008)  Protection  of ‘Critical  Infrastructure’  and  the Role
of Investment  Policies  Relating  to National  Security.  Paris:  OECD,  p. 5.  See  also
Brommelhorster,  J.  et  al.  (2004)  Critical  Infrastructure  Protection:  Survey  of World-wide
Activities. BSI KRITIS, (4), p. 1.
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international  cooperation  and  cybersecurity  awareness  raising.  In this
regard, the Convention recognizes the sovereign right of each Member State
to adopt any strategy that it deems fit or appropriate in order to effectively
implement  its  national  cybersecurity  policy.  The obligation  under
Article 24:2 of the Convention also requires that a Member State’s national
cybersecurity  strategy  should  define  the organizational  structures  for
cybersecurity governance, set objectives and timeframes for the successful
implementation  of the national  cybersecurity  policy,  and  also  establish
the critical  basis  for  the effective  management  of cybersecurity  incidents
and international cooperation in such matters. 
To a large  extent,  the Convention’s  requirement  that  Member  States
should  establish  cybersecurity  policies  and  strategies  appears  similar
to Article 7  of the European  Union  (EU)  Directive  on Network  and
Information Security (2016)46 which also requires Member States to adopt 
“a national  strategy  on the security  of network  and  information  systems
defining  the strategic  objectives  and  appropriate  policy  and  regulatory
measures with a view to achieving and maintaining a high level of security
of network and information systems […]”.47
3.2 OBLIGATIONS TO PROMOTE A CULTURE 
OF CYBERSECURITY
Article  26  of the Convention  establishes  obligations  on Member  States
to promote  a culture  of cybersecurity  amongst  all  stakeholders  (such
as governmental institutions, businesses and the civil society) that develop,
operate, or use information systems and networks.48 In this respect, Article
26:1 (a) of the Convention declares that
“the culture  of cybersecurity  should  lay  emphasis  on security
in the development  of information  systems  and  networks,  and
on the adoption  of new  ways  of thinking  and  behaving  when  using
46 See  Directive  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  of 6 July 2016  concerning
Measures  for  a High  Common  Level  of Security  of Network  and  Information  Systems
across the Union,  Official Journal of the European Union (2016/1148) 19 July 2016) (hereafter
EU Directive on Network and Information Security, 2016).
47 See Article 7:1 EU Directive on Network and Information Security (2016).
48 See Article 26:1(a) AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection.
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information  systems  as well  as during  communication  or transactions
across networks”.49
The need  for  the promotion  of a culture  of cybersecurity  arises  from
the increasing  interconnection  of networks  and  the growing  integration
of networked ICTs to many of the essential  aspects of daily life,  including
the provision of goods and services, research and development, innovation
and entrepreneurship, and the free flow of information amongst individuals
and organizations,  governments,  businesses  and civil  society.50 This  state
of affairs implies that cybersecurity governance issues are not meant to be
addressed only through the application of law enforcement or technological
measures,  but  rather  through  holistic  governance  approaches  that  are
widely supported by society.51
The obligation  to promote  a culture  of cybersecurity  under  Article  26
of the Convention  requires  Member  States  to take  the lead  in developing
a cybersecurity culture within their national territories by promoting public
awareness and providing education and training on cybersecurity.52 In this
regard, Member States have obligations to
“adopt  measures  to develop  capacity  building  with  a view  to offering
training which covers all areas of cybersecurity to different stakeholders, and
setting standards for the private sector”.53 
This  also  includes  the promotion  of technical  education  for  ICT
professionals  in both the public  and private sectors through certifications
and  standardization  trainings.54 In addition,  Member  States  are  required
to develop  a public-private  partnership  model  that  will  engage
the participation of stakeholders such as industry groups,  the civil  society
and the academia in promoting a culture of cybersecurity.55
49 See Article 26:1(a) AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection.
50 See United Nations Resolution on the Creation of a Global Culture of Cybersecurity, 21 December
2009 (A/RES/64/211).  See  also  United  Nations  Resolution  on the Creation  of a Global  Culture
of Cybersecurity, 23 December 2003 (A/RES/58/199).
51 See ITU (2009) National Cybersecurity/CIIP Self-Assessment Tool. Geneva: ITU, p. 26. See also
United  Nations  Resolution  on the  Creation  of a Global  Culture  of Cybersecurity,
20 December 2003 (A/RES/57/239).
52 See Article 26:2 AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection.
53 See Article 26:4 id.
54 Id.
55 See Article 26:3 id.
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3.4 OBLIGATIONS TO ESTABLISH NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
Article 25:2  of the Convention  imposes  obligations  on Member  States
to establish  appropriate  structures  or institutions  as well  as regulatory
powers  that  are  necessary  for  cybersecurity  governance.  Article 27:1(a)
of the Convention also requires Member States 
“to adopt  the necessary  measures  to establish  an appropriate  institutional
mechanism responsible for cybersecurity governance”.56 
to a large  extent,  the provisions  of Articles 25:2  and  27:1(a)
of the Convention have  similar  implications  with  Article  8(1)  of the EU
Directive  on Network  and  Information  Security  (2016),  which  requires
Member States to
“designate  one  or more  national  competent  authorities  on the security
of network and information systems”.57
Under the Convention, the obligations to establish national cybersecurity
governance  structures  requires  the establishment  of appropriate  national
institutions  with  responsibilities  to tackle  cybercrimes  and  respond
to cybersecurity  incidents,  and  also  facilitate  international  cooperation
in the management  of such  incidents.58 Thus,  within  the context  of those
obligations,  it  is  implied  that  every  Member  State  should  establish
institutions  such  as a national  cybersecurity  agency  and  a national
Computer  Emergency  Response  Team  (CERT).59 The Convention  also
requires  that  national  cybersecurity  governance  structures  should  be
established within a national framework that can respond to challenges and
issues affecting all  aspects of cybersecurity at the national level.60 In order
to ensure  the effective  functioning  of national  cybersecurity  structures,
the Convention  requires  Members  States  to take  necessary  measures
to establish  clear  accountability  on cybersecurity  issues  at all  levels
of government  by defining  the roles  and  responsibilities  of institutions
56 See Article 27:1(a) AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection.
57 See Article 8:1 EU Directive on Network and Information Security (2016).
58 See Article 27:2 AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection. 
59 See Article 28:3 id.
60 See Article 27:1(c) id.
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in clear  and  precise  terms61 and  also  expressing  a clear  public  and
transparent  commitment  to the promotion  of cybersecurity,  including
encouraging  the participation  of the private  sector  in governmental
initiatives to promote cybersecurity.62
3.5 OBLIGATIONS TO PROTECT CRITICAL INFORMATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE
The Convention  establishes  obligations  on Member  States  to protect  CII.
In this  respect,  Article 25:4  of the Convention  requires  Member  States
to adopt  necessary  legislative  and  regulatory  measures  to identify  those
sectors  that  are  “sensitive”  to their  national  security  and  economic
wellbeing, and also to classify the ICT systems that are designed to function
in those  sectors  as elements  of CII.  Although,  the Convention  does  not
define the meaning of CII, it however classifies CII in relation to the concept
of “Critical  Cyber/ICT  Infrastructure”.63 Under  Article  1  of the Convention
the concept of Critical Cyber/ICT Infrastructure is defined as 
“the cyber infrastructure that is essential to vital services for public safety,
economic  stability,  national  security,  international  stability  and  for
the sustainability and restoration of critical cyberspace”.64 
The CII  protection  obligations  under  Article  25:4  of the Convention
requires Member States to establish severe sanctions for  cybercrimes and
other criminal activities that affect ICT systems in critical sectors and also
establish  measures  to improve  the security  and  management  of such
systems.65 Article 30:1(d)  of the Convention  also  creates  a CII  protection
obligation which requires Member States to
“establish  necessary  criminal  law measures  to restrict  access  to protected
systems which have been classified as critical national defence infrastructure
due to the critical national security data they contain”.66 
The Convention does not provide a definition of “critical national defence
infrastructure”, however, within the context the term would apparently refer
61 See Article 27:1(b) (i) AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection.
62 See Article 27:1(b) (ii) id.
63 See Article 1 id.
64 Id.
65 See Article 25:4 id.
66 See Article 30:1(d) id.
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to CII (critical cyber/ICT infrastructure) which are used to provide national
defence  services,  such  as computer  systems  that  are  used  for  national
security or military operations.
The Convention does not  explicitly  classify  the sectors  that  should  be
regarded  as “sensitive”  to the national  security  and  economic  wellbeing
of Member  States.  Apparently,  the absence  of such  explicit  classification
could  be  due to the fact  that  sectors  which  are  designated  as “sensitive”
vary  in different  countries.67 However,  the common  trend  in establishing
such  classification  is  that  where  the prolonged  disruption  of a sector
or infrastructure  would  affect  the wellbeing  of a State  by causing  severe
economic  dislocation  or national  security  challenges,  then  such  sector
or infrastructure is  generally regarded as being “sensitive” to the national
security  and  economic  wellbeing  of the State  and  therefore  classified
as a “critical sector” or “critical infrastructure”.68 Such sectors include (but
are not limited to) banking and financial  services,  governmental services,
telecommunications services and ICT infrastructure providers,  emergency
and  rescue  services,  energy  and  electricity  services,  health  services,
transportation services  including  traffic  management services,  and water
supply  and distribution  services.69 Generally,  most  of the sectors  that  are
classified as “critical sectors” rely heavily on elements of ICT systems such
as computer  technologies  and  digital  networks  to function  effectively.
Consequently, those elements of ICT systems in critical sectors are classified
as CII.  Therefore,  the CII  concept  is  generally used to designate  core ICT
elements  including  interconnected  and  interdependent  information
network  systems  that  are  vital  to the functioning  of critical  sectors  and
essential services in modern societies.
The essence  of establishing  CII  protection  obligations  in the African
context arise from the increasing penetration of ICTs in Africa70 which has
given  rise  to their  growing  integration  in sectors  that  can  be  classified
67 See  generally,  Gordon,  K.  and  Dion,  M.  (2008)  Protection  of ‘Critical  Infrastructure’  and
the Role of Investment Policies Relating to National Security. Paris: OECD.
68 See the United States President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP).
(1997)  Critical  Foundations:  Protecting  America’s  Infrastructure.  Washington  DC:  PCCIP,
Appendix B, Glossary B-2.
69 See  Dunn,  M.  (2005)  A Comparative  Analysis  of Cybersecurity  Initiatives  Worldwide.
World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) Thematic Meeting on Cybersecurity. Geneva: ITU,
p. 14. See Annex II EU Directive on Network and Information Security (2016).
70 See GSMA (2016)  The Mobile Economy Africa 2016. London: GSMA, pp. 2, 8 & 19. See also,
Miniwatts  Marketing  Group (2017)  Internet  Usage  Statistics  for  Africa.  [online]  Miniwatts
Marketing Group. Available from: http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm [Accessed
6 June 2018].
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as critical  sectors.  This  increasing  integration  of ICTs  in critical  sectors  is
also  seen  a means  of facilitating  Africa’s  economic  development  and
regional  integration.71 However,  while  African  States  have  not  achieved
a high  level  of digitalization  that  is  comparable  to developed  countries,
the rise  of digitalization  in Africa  has  increased  the reliance  of critical
sectors  on ICT  elements  as well as interconnected  and  interdependent
information  network  systems,  to the extent  that  the disruption  of such
infrastructure by accidents or malicious acts could also cause the disruption
of economic  and  social  activities  as well  as public  services,  and  thereby
trigger  national  security  concerns.72 Therefore,  African  States  are  also
vulnerable  to cybersecurity  threats  which  affect  the elements  of critical
sectors that rely on information infrastructure usually classified as CII. This
appears to underscore the reason why Article 25:4 of the Convention aims
to enhance  the protection  of CII  in Africa  by imposing  obligations  on AU
Member States to establish legal and policy measures for their identification
and protection.
3.6 OBLIGATIONS TO ESTABLISH CYBERCRIME OFFENCES 
AND PROCEDURAL MEASURES
Article 25:1  of the Convention  imposes  obligations  on Member  States
to criminalize  substantive  criminal  acts  that  affect  the confidentiality,
integrity, availability and survival of ICT systems, and the data processed
by such systems. This implies that Member States are required to establish
offences  that  criminalize  acts  such  as unauthorized  access  to a computer
system,  unauthorized  interference  with  a computer  system  or data,  and
unauthorized  interception  of data  processed  by a computer  system.
In addition,  Article 25:1  of the Convention  requires  Member  States
to criminalize  substantive  criminal  acts  that  affect  ICT  network
infrastructure.  This  entails  the establishment  of offences  that  criminalize
attacks  against  CII.  The Convention  also  requires  Member  States
to explicitly criminalize cybercrime offences including: attacks on computer
systems;73 unauthorized  access  to computer  systems;74 acts  that  hinder
71 See GSMA (2016), n. 70, p. 2. See also GSMA (2013) Sub-Saharan Africa Mobile Economy Report
2013. London: A.T. Kearney, p. 4.
72 See Solutions Consulting (2018) West Africa Cybersecurity Indexing and Readiness Assessment.
Florida, United States: Solutions Consulting, p. 8.
73 See Article 29:1 AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection.
74 See Article 29:1(a) id.
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the functioning  of a computer;75 unauthorized  modification  of computer
data;76 unauthorized  interception  of computer  data;77 computer  data
forgery;78 computer fraud;79 child pornography offences;80 and preparatory
offences relating to the misuse of computing devices, such as the unlawful
production, sale, importation, possession, or making available of computer
equipment,  program, or any device  or data that  is  “designed or specifically
adapted” for the purpose of committing any cybercrime offence.81 To some
extent, the Convention’s requirement that Member States should explicitly
criminalize  the above  cybercrime  offences  appears  similar  to some
of the obligations  under the European Union Directive  on Attacks against
Information Systems (2013).82 For example, the Directive requires Member
States  to criminalize  illegal  access  to information  systems,83 illegal
interference  with  information  systems,84 illegal  data  interference,85 and
illegal data interception.86
Article  25:1  of the Convention  also  imposes  obligations  on Member
States  to establish  effective  procedural  mechanisms  for  the prosecution
of cybercrime  offences.  Such procedural  mechanisms  are  basically  meant
to enhance  the legal  capabilities  of law  enforcement  authorities
to investigate and prosecute cybercrime offences, and they usually include
measures to facilitate the search, seizure, or preservation of digital evidence,
or the interception  of electronic  communications.  While  establishing
substantive and procedural legal measures to tackle cybercrimes, Member
States  are  also  required  to take  into  consideration  the choice  of language
that is used in international best practices.87 This implies that Member States
are  to consider  the choice  of language  that  is  used  in international
75 See Article 29:1(d) AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection.
76 See Article 29:1(e) & (f) id.
77 See Article 29:2(a) id.
78 See Article 29:2(b) id.
79 See Article 29:2(d) id.
80 See Article 29:3(1) id.
81 See Article 29:2(b) id.
82 See  Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 2013 on Attacks
against  Information  Systems  (2013/40/EU)  replacing  Council  Framework  Decision
2005/222/JHA. Official Journal of the European Union, 14. August 2013 (hereafter, EU Directive
on Attacks against Information Systems, 2013).
83 See Article 3 EU Directive on Attacks against Information Systems (2013).
84 See Article 4 id.
85 See Article 5 id.
86 See Article 6 id.
87 See Article 25:1 AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection.
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instruments and model laws on cybercrime such as the Council  of Europe
Convention  on Cybercrime  and  the ITU  Toolkit  for  Cybercrime
Legislation.88 Apparently, this obligation aims to encourage Member States
to draft  substantive  and  procedural  legal  measures  on cybercrime
in a technology  neutral  language  in order  to promote  the international
harmonization of national cybercrime laws and procedural measures. 
In addition,  Article  25:3  of the Convention  requires  Member  States
to ensure that the establishment and implementation of legal measures for
cybersecurity  governance  does  not  infringe  the constitutional  rights
of citizens,  such as the right to freedom of expression, the right to privacy,
the right  to fair  hearing,  and other  fundamental  rights that  are protected
under  national  or international  law,  including  those  established  under
the African  Charter  on Human  and  People’s  Rights.89 This  requirement
appears  similar  to some  degree  with  the approach  that  is  adopted
by the Council  of Europe  Convention  on Cybercrime.  Thus,  the Council
of Europe Convention on Cybercrime requires Member States to ensure that
their  procedural  instruments  for  the investigation  and  prosecution
of cybercrime do not violate fundamental human rights.90
3.7 OBLIGATIONS TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION AND LEGAL HARMONIZATION
The Convention  establishes  a framework  to facilitate  international
cooperation on cybersecurity and cybercrime control within the AU. In this
regard, Member States are required to
“encourage  the establishment  of institutions  that  exchange  information
on cyber threats and vulnerability assessment such as Computer Emergency
Response Teams (CERTs) or Computer Security Incident Response Teams
(CSIRTs)”.91
Article 28:4 of the Convention also requires Member States to
88 See ITU and American Bar Association - Privacy and Computer Crime Committee (2010)
ITU Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation. Geneva: ITU.
89 See  African  (Banjul)  Charter  on Human  and  Peoples’  Rights,  27 June 1981  (OAU  Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58) which entered into force on 21 October 1986.
90 See Article 15:2 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime.
91 See Article 28:3 Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection.
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“make  use  of existing  channels  for  international  cooperation  with  a view
to responding to cyber threats and improving cybersecurity and stimulating
dialogue between stakeholders”.92 
Such channels for international cooperation may be based on international
or intergovernmental  or regional  arrangements,  or private  and  public
partnerships.93 
In order  to facilitate  the effective  harmonization  of legal  rules  and
international  cooperation  amongst  Member  States,  Article 28:1
of the Convention establishes obligations on Member States to
“ensure  that  the legislative  measures  and/or regulations  adopted  to fight
against cybercrime will strengthen the possibility of regional harmonization
[…] and respect the principle of double criminal liability”.94 
Article 28:2 of the Convention also provides that Member States that do not
have mutual assistance agreements on cybercrime
“shall  undertake  to encourage  the signing  of agreements  on mutual  legal
assistance in conformity with the principle of double criminal liability, while
promoting  the exchange  of information  as well as the efficient  sharing
of data  between  the organizations  of [Member  States]  on a bilateral  and
mutual basis”.95
This  implies  that  Member  States  that  lack  mutual  legal  assistance
agreements  on cybercrime  have obligations  to engage in such  agreements
in accordance with the principles of double criminality (dual criminality).96
92 See Article 28:4 AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection.
93 Id.
94 See Article 28:1 id.
95 See Article 28:2 id.
96 “Double  criminality”  or “dual  criminality”  exists  where  a conduct  in issue  has  been
criminalized  in the laws  of both  the State  requesting  for  assistance  or extradition  and
the State to whom such request for assistance or extradition is being made to. Under this
principle,  an extradition  request  can  only  be  granted  in accordance  with  an extradition
treaty between two countries where both countries have criminalized the criminal conduct
for  which  an extradition  request  is  sought  and  the crimes  are  punishable  by one  year
imprisonment  or more.  See  ITU High  Level  Experts  Group  [HLEG].  (2008)  ITU  Global
Cyber-Security  Agenda  (GCA)  High  Level  Experts  Group  [HLEG]  Global  Strategic  Report.
Geneva: ITU, p. 14.  See also Garner, B. A. (ed.) (2004).  The Black’s Law Dictionary. 8th ed.,
St Paul MN, United States: West Publishing Co, p. 537.
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4. THE STATUS OF THE AU CYBERSECURITY 
CONVENTION IN THE DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDERS
Having  discussed  the Convention’s  Member  State  obligations  that  aim
to promote  cyber  stability,  this  section  will  discuss  the legal  status
of the Convention  in the domestic  legal  systems  of Member  States.
Article 35  of the AU  Cybersecurity  Convention  provides  that
the Convention 
“shall be open to all Member States of the Union, for signature, ratification
or accession,  in conformity  with  their  respective  constitutional
procedures”.97 
The Convention  will  enter  into  force  after  it  has  been  ratified  by 15 AU
Member  States.98 According  to a report  by the AU,  as of May  2018,  only
10 AU  Member  States  (Benin,  Chad,  Comoros,  Congo,  Ghana,  Guinea-
Bissau,  Mauritania,  Sierra Leone, Sao Tome & Principe and Zambia)  had
signed the Convention, while two Member States (Mauritius and Senegal)
had  ratified  the Convention.99 The AU  report  also  showed  that
the signatures and ratifications were done in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 with
none  in 2014 when  the Convention  was  adopted.100 This  slow  pace
of Member  States  towards  signing  and  ratifying  the Convention  would
hinder  the timely  achievement  of its  objectives  such  as the harmonization
of cybersecurity  laws  in Member States.  More importantly,  the slow pace
of ratifications  also  indicates  that  it  will  probably  take some more years
before  the Convention  can  be  ratified  by the required  15  Member  States
in order  for  it  to have  legal  force  within  the AU.  This  state  of affairs
practically impedes the sense of urgency that should normally characterize
cybersecurity governance responses and also has the effect of slowing down
the urgency of implementing the Convention’s obligations.
However,  it  is  also  recognized  that  one  of the major  challenges
to the effective  implementation  of international  and  regional  legal
instruments  has  been  how  to balance  national  sovereignty  concerns
97 See Article 35 AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection.
98 See Article 36 id.
99 See African Union. (2018)  List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African
Union  Convention  on Cyber  Security  and  Personal  Data  Protection. [online]  African  Union.
Available from: https//au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/29560-slafrican_union_convention_
on_cyber_security_and_personal_data_protection.pdf [Accessed 6 June 2018].
100 Id.
2018] U. J. Orji: The African Union Convention on Cybersecurity ... 111
by Member States and the obligations under such legal instruments in order
to ensure  that  they  are  recognized  and  domestically  implemented
by Member  States.  The AU  comprises  English  speaking  (Anglophone),
French  speaking  (Francophone)  and  Portuguese  speaking  (Lusophone)
Member  States  that  operate  different  legal  systems  with  respect
to the domestic  reception  of international  or regional  legal  instruments.
The Anglophone States that are Members of the AU operate a dualist legal
tradition. Under the dualist legal tradition, national law and international
law  are  considered  as two  distinct  categories  of legal  systems.  Hence,
regional  legal  instruments,  such  as the AU  Cybersecurity  Convention,
cannot be directly applied within the national legal system of a dualist State,
unless  they  have  been  domesticated  by an Act  of the parliament.  For
example, in Nigeria which is an AU Member State that operates a dualist
legal tradition, Section 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution provides that 
“No  treaty  between  the Federation  and  any  other  country  shall  have
the force  of law  except  to the extent  to which  any  such  treaty  has  been
enacted into law by the National Assembly”.101
A similar legal requirement exists in the Constitutions of other Anglophone
Member States within the AU.102
On the other  hand,  Francophone  States  that  are  Members  of the AU
operate a monist legal tradition. Under this tradition, international law and
national  law  are  regarded  as the manifestations  of a single  conception
of law  since  both  laws  are  meant  to apply  to the conduct  of the same
subjects.103 The monist  legal  tradition  is  regarded  as having  its  root
in national law theories which see all law as the product of reason.104 Thus,
it 
101 See Section 12:1 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999).
102 See  for  e.g., Section 79:1  Constitution of the Gambia (1997); Section 75:1  Constitution of Ghana
(1992); Article 40:4(1) Constitution of Sierra Leone (1991), and; Section 57 Constitution of Liberia
(1986).
103 See  Oji,  E. A.  (2011)  Application  of Customary  International  Law  in Nigerian  Courts.
Nigeria Institute of Advanced Legal Studies Law and Development Journal, 1(1), p. 156.
104 See  Oppong, R. F. (2008) Making Regional Economic Laws Enforceable in National Legal
Systems: Constitutional and Judicial Challenges. In Bosi, A. and Breytenbech, W. et al (eds.)
Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Year Book. Stellenbosch: Trade Law Center
for Southern Africa, pp. 10–11.
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“envisions  international  law  to automatically  be  part  of national  legal
systems and suggests that no conflict can arise between international and
national law because they derive from the same source”.105 
Accordingly,  the monist  legal  tradition  allows  international  law
or community law to become part of a State’s national law without the need
for an enactment to domesticate such international law within a State’s legal
system,  provided  that  such  law  is  reciprocally  enforced  by other  State
parties.  Therefore,  an AU  Member  State  that  operates  a monist  legal
tradition  would  allow  a regional  legal  instrument  such  as the AU
Cybersecurity  Convention  to become  part  of its  national  law  without
the need for  the domestication of the Convention within that  State’s  legal
system,  provided  however,  that  the Convention  is  reciprocally  enforced
by other  Member  States.  For  example,  in the Republic  of Benin  which  is
an AU  Member  State  that  operates  a monist  legal  tradition,  Article 147
of the Constitution  provides  that  treaties  or agreements  lawfully  ratified
shall  have  upon  their  publication  an authority  superior  to that  of laws,
without  prejudice  for  each  agreement  or treaty  in its  application
by the other  party.106 A similar  legal  requirement  exists  in other
Francophone States within the AU.107 The Lusophone States within the AU
also practice a monist legal tradition and establish similar requirements for
the enforcement of regional legal instruments such as the AU Cybersecurity
Convention.108
5. PROSPECTS OF APPLYING THE CONVENTION 
AS A FRAMEWORK FOR REGIONAL CYBER STABILITY
The AU  Cybersecurity  Convention  holds  several  prospects  towards
promoting  regional  cyber  stability  in Africa.  Such  prospects  arise  from
105 See Oppong, R. F. (2008) n. 104, p. 11.
106 See Section 147 Constitution of the Republic of Benin (1990).
107 See  for  e.g.,  Article  98  of the Constitution  of Senegal  (2001)  which  provides  that  treaties
or agreements duly ratified shall, upon their publication, have an authority superior to that
of the laws, subject to its application by the other party.
108 See  for  e.g.,  Article  11:2  of the Constitution  of Cape  Verde (1992)  which  provides  that
“international  treaties  and agreements,  validly  approved  or ratified,  shall  be  in force  in the Cape
Verdian legal order after their official publication and their entry into force in the international legal
order, and for the time that they are internationally binding on the State of Cape Verde”. See also
Article  11:4  of the Constitution  of Cape  Verde which  provides  that  rules  and  principles
of general  or common  international  law  and  of conventional  international  law,  validly
approved  or ratified,  shall  prevail,  after  their  entry  into  force  in the international  and
domestic  legal  orders  over  all  legislative  and  domestic  normative  acts  of an infra-
-constitutional value.
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the fact  that  the establishment  of the Convention  increases  policy  and
regulatory  awareness  on cybersecurity  governance,  while  also  improving
the harmonization of national cybersecurity regimes in AU Member States.
Other  prospects  of the Convention  in this  regard  include  that  it  imposes
a range of positive  obligations on AU Member States to establish national
cybersecurity  regimes,  and also  increases  the possibility  of imposing  AU
sanctions on non-compliant Member States. These prospects are discussed
below.
5.1 INCREASED CYBERSECURITY AWARENESS
One of the major advantages of establishing regional legal instruments for
cybersecurity governance is that they enhance the cybersecurity awareness
of regional  organizations  and  their  Member  States.109 As such,  there  are
prospects  that  the establishment  of the AU  Cybersecurity  Convention
would help to promote cyber stability by increasing regional and national
awareness  on cybercrime  and  cybersecurity  governance  in Africa.  Such
awareness can also help to facilitate the establishment of cybersecurity laws
and  policies  and  other  governance  frameworks,  such  as CERTs  in AU
Member  States  that  are  yet  to establish  such  frameworks.  For  example,
as of June, 2018, about 40 States out of the 55 States of the African continent
had  established  laws  on cybersecurity,  while  about  20  States  had
established national cybersecurity policies, and, on the other hand, 18 States
had national CERT frameworks.110 
5.2 HARMONIZATION OF NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY 
REGIMES
Another  advantage  of establishing  regional  legal  instruments  for
cybersecurity  governance  is  that  such  instruments  provide  a model
framework  of minimum  standards  that  will  guide  Member  States
in the development of their  national  cybersecurity regimes.  In this  regard,
109 See Orji,  U. J.  (2016)  Regionalizing  Cybersecurity  Governance  in Africa:  An Assessment
of Responses.  In Samuel,  C.  and Sharma,  M.  (eds.)  Securing  Cyberspace:  International  and
Asian Perspectives. New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses & Pentagon Press,
p. 211.
110 See UNCTAD. (2018) Cybercrime Laws.  [online] Available from: http://www.unctad.org/en/
Docs/Cyberlaw/CC.xlsx [Accessed on 6 June 2018]. See ITU. (2018)  Cybersecurity Country
Profiles. [online]  Available  from:  https//www.itu/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Documents/
Country_Profiles/  [Accessed  6 June 2018].  See  also  African  Union  and  Symantec
Corporation. (2016)  Cyber Crime & Cyber Security Trends in Africa. United States: Symantec
Corporation, pp. 53–56.
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harmonization  refers  to the process  of creating  common standards within
Member  States  that  belong  to a common  regional  or international
intergovernmental  body  with  a view to promoting  uniformity  in national
laws  and  policies.  Harmonization  helps  to coordinate  different  national
legal  and  regulatory  systems  by eliminating  or minimizing  major
differences  in national  laws  and policies,  and thereby creating  minimum
standards in a manner that makes them similar with each other.111 Within
the context  of cybersecurity  governance,  the harmonization  of national
cybersecurity regimes through regional  instruments contributes  to a large
extent  in minimizing  national  differences  in such  regimes  and also  helps
in promoting  regional  cybersecurity  cooperation.  Thus,  to a large  extent,
the AU Cybersecurity  Convention’s  establishment  of minimum  standards
that are meant to guide Member States in the development of their national
cybersecurity regimes also has prospects to promote regional cyber stability
through legal harmonization and cybersecurity cooperation within the AU.
5.3 IMPOSITION OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS ON MEMBER 
STATES
Apparently, the most significant implication that arises from the adoption
of the AU  Cybersecurity  Convention  by Member  States  is  that
the Convention  imposes  positive  obligations  on them  to promote  cyber
stability  by establishing  legal,  policy  and  regulatory  frameworks
on cybersecurity  governance  and cybercrime  control.  As such,  every  AU
Member  State  that  is  a party  to the Convention  has  positive  obligations
to establish  national  cybersecurity  laws,  as well  as policy  and  regulatory
frameworks that enshrine the standards under the Convention. Thus, under
international  law,  the general  principle  of pacta  sunt  servanda which  is
expressed  in Article 26  of the Vienna  Convention  on the Law  of Treaties
declares that 
“every  treaty  in force  is  binding  upon  the parties  to it  and  must  be
performed by them in good faith.”112 
The Vienna Convention further declares that 
111 See  Shuma,  T.  (2015)  Revisiting  Legal  Harmonization  under  the Southern  African
Development  Community  Treaty:  The Need  to Amend  the Treaty.  Law,  Democracy  and
Development, 19, pp. 135–136. See also Walter, J. K. (1974) Comparative Law: A Theoretical
Framework. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 23 (3), p. 501.
112 See Article 26, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969.
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“a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for
its failure to perform a treaty”.113 
Consequently, it appears that, once the AU Cybersecurity Convention has
entered  into  force,  the positive  obligations  under  the Convention  can
provide a basis for holding a Member State accountable, where the latter’s
failure  to fulfill  the obligations  to establish  relevant  cybersecurity
governance  frameworks  has  encouraged  the perpetration  of cybercrime
which  results  in the violation  of human  rights,  such  as those  rights
guaranteed  under  African  international  human  rights  instruments,
including the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,114 the African
Charter  on Rights  and  Welfare  of the Child,115 and  the Protocol
on the Rights of Women in Africa.116 In this regard, another Member State,
or an individual, or a non-governmental organization that has an Observer
status before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, can
directly institute an action before the African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights  for  a determination  of a Member  State’s  liability  for  the non-
fulfillment  of its  positive  obligations  under  the AU  Cybersecurity
Convention.117
A Member  State’s  failure  to fulfill  the obligations  under  the AU
Cybersecurity  Convention  can  also  provide  a valid  basis  for  bringing
a Communication before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights,  where  the non-fulfillment  of those  obligations  has  resulted
in the violation  of any  of the rights  guaranteed under  the African  Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights.118 In this respect, an individual may bring
a Communication  before  the Commission  to determine  a Member  State’s
liability,  where  the failure  of such  Member  State  to fulfill  the obligations
under  the Convention  (such  as the establishment  of legal  and  regulatory
frameworks  for  cybersecurity  governance)  has  passively  encouraged
the perpetration  of cybercrimes  that  resulted  in the violation  of any
113 See Article 27 id.
114 See  African  (Banjul)  Charter  on Human  and  Peoples’  Rights,  27 June  1981  (OAU  Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58). 
115 See African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1990 (OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49).
116 See  Protocol  to the African  Charter  on Human  and  Peoples’  Rights  on the Rights  of Women
in Africa, 11 July 2003.
117 See  Articles  5:1  & 5:3  Protocol  to the African  Charter  on Human  and  Peoples’  Rights
on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 10 June 1998.
118 See Articles 45, 47 and 56 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1982).
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of the human rights under the African Charter.119 The possibility of holding
an AU  Member  State  accountable  for  its  failure  to fulfill  the obligations
under the African Charter has already been illustrated in several decisions
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).120 For
example, in Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center
for Social and Economic Rights (CESR) v. Nigeria121, a Communication which
was brought before the ACHPR alleged that the Nigerian government had
been  directly  involved  in oil  production  through  the Nigerian  National
Petroleum Company (NNPC) alongside other multinational oil companies,
and  that  oil  production  caused  environmental  degradation  and  severe
health problems amongst the Ogoni people of the Niger Delta. The ACHPR
found  the Nigerian  government  liable  for  not  fulfilling  its  positive
obligations  under  the African  Charter  as a result  of its  failure  to take
measures  to prevent  environmental  pollution  and  promote  sustainable
development use of natural resources in Ogoni land.122 Thus,  the ACHPR,
while  finding  Nigeria  liable  for  the violation  of the right  to health  and
the right to a generally satisfactory environment under Articles  16 and 24
of the African Charter, held that 
“the State  is  obliged  to protect  right  holders  against  other  subjects
by legislation and provision of effective remedies  […] [and that] protection
generally  entails  the creation  and  maintenance  of an atmosphere
or framework  by an effective  interplay  of laws  and  regulations  so that
individuals will be able to freely realize their rights and freedoms”.123 
The ACHPR also  held  that  a State  is  required  to fulfill  the rights  and
freedoms it freely undertook under the various human right regimes.124 
The possibility  of holding  a State  accountable  for  the non-fulfillment
of its  treaty  obligations  has  also  been  illustrated  outside  Africa
119 See  Articles  55  and  56  id. See  also,  Hansungule,  M.  African  Courts  and  the African
Commission  on Human  and  Peoples’  Rights.  In Bosi,  A.  and  Diescho,  J.  (2009)  Human
Rights  in Africa:  Legal  Perspective  on their  Protection  and  Promotion. Namibia:  Macmillan
Education, p. 259.
120 See Free Legal Assistances Group and Others v. Zaire, ACHPR/COMM, No.25/89, 47/90, 56/91,
100/93 (1995), and;  International Penn & Others (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v. Nigeria, ACHPR/
COMM, 137/94, 139/94, 154/96, 161/97 (1998).
121 See  Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for Social and Economic
Rights (CESR) v. Nigeria, Communication No. 155/96, ACHPR/COMM/A044/1 (2002).
122 See Coomans,  F.  (2003)  The Ogoni  Case before  the African  Commission  on Human and
Peoples’ Rights’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 52, pp. 749-760.
123 See SERA and CESR v. Nigeria, at paragraphs 46-47.
124 Id. at paragraph 47.
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by the decisions  of the European  Court  of Human  Rights  in the cases
of K.U.  v. Finland125 and  I.  v. Finland.126 In both  cases,  the Court  found
the State  of Finland  liable  for  not  taking  adequate  measures  to fulfill
the positive obligations that are attached to the right to a private life under
Article  8 of the European Convention  for  the Protection  of Human Rights
and  Fundamental  Freedoms  (1950)  due  to Finland’s  failure  to timely
establish adequate cybercrime and data protection frameworks.
Also,  even  where  an AU  Member  State  has  not  adopted  or ratified
the AU  Cybersecurity  Convention,  there  are  still  prospects  that  such
Member  State  can  be  held  accountable  for  failing  to establish  adequate
cybersecurity  governance  frameworks  that  will  ensure  the protection
of the human rights guaranteed under its national laws, or under Africa’s
human  right  treaties.  This  is  because  the guarantee  of human  rights
in national  laws  or international  treaties  imposes  obligations  on States
to ensure their protection,127 and also gives rise to citizens’ expectation that
such  rights  will  be  protected  by the State.  Therefore,  the mere  fact  that
an AU  Member  State  has  guaranteed  human  rights  in its  national  laws
or as a State  party  to any  of the AU’s  human right  treaties  would  trigger
obligations to protect its citizens from malicious cyber acts that can infringe
on those human rights. For example, malicious cyber acts such as hacking
and denial of service of attacks can infringe the exercise of several human
rights including the right to privacy,128 the right to receive information and
express  ideas,129 the right  to freedom  of association,130 and  the right
to education.131 As such, there exists a legitimate expectation by citizens that
their  fundamental  human  rights  will  be  protected  by the State  against
malicious  cyber  acts,  which  can  impede  the exercise  of those  rights.
Consequently, if an AU Member State that has not signed or ratified the AU
Cybersecurity  Convention  has also  failed  to establish  adequate  measures
to tackle cybercrimes that can infringe on the exercise of the human rights
125 Judgment of 2 December 2008, ECHR No. 2872/02.
126 Judgment of 17 July 2008, ECHR No. 20511/03.
127 See Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for Social and Economic
Rights v. Nigeria, at paragraphs 46–47.
128 See Article 10 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990).
129 See  Article  9  African Charter  on Human and  Peoples’  Rights (1982).  See  Article  17  African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990).
130 See  Article  10  African Charter  on Human and  Peoples’  Rights (1982).  See  Article  8  African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990).
131 See Article 17  African Charter on Human and Peoples’  Rights (1982).  See Article 11  African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990).
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guaranteed  under  its  national  laws  or under  African  human  right
instruments,  then  such  Member  State  would  be  failing  in its  obligation
to protect those rights. 
5.4 THE POSSIBILITY OF AU SANCTIONS ON NON-COMPLIANT
MEMBER STATES
Another significant  implication of the AU Cybersecurity Convention with
respect  to the promotion  of cyber  stability  is  that  it  would  enhance
the possibility of applying AU sanction mechanisms against Member States
that fail to fulfill their obligations under the Convention when it enters into
force.  Thus,  AU  Member  States  are  generally  bound  to comply  with
the “decisions  and  policies”  of the AU  including  those  made  by the AU
Executive  Council  and  the AU  Assembly  of Heads  of State  and
Government. In this  respect,  Article 23:2 of the Constitutive Act of the AU
provides that
“Any  Member  State  that  fails  to comply  with  the decisions  and  policies
of the Union  may  be  subjected  to other  sanctions,  such  as the denial
of transport and communications links with other Member States and other
measures  of a political  and  economic  nature  to be  determined
by the Assembly”.132
The AU Cybersecurity Convention clearly constitutes a decision and policy
of the AU.133 As such,  once  the Convention  has  entered  into  force,
Article 23:2  of the AU  Constitutive  Act  would  provide  a legal  basis  for
the AU  to administer  sanctions  against  Member  States  that  fail
to implement  their  obligations  under  the Convention.  However,  despite
the existence  of sanction  mechanisms  within  the AU’s  governance
framework,  the AU  has  rarely  applied  sanctions  for  the purpose
of promoting  the national  implementation  of its  legal  instruments,  or for
the purpose  of facilitating  the transposition  of such  instruments  in order
to promote  legal  harmonization  amongst  Member  States.134 Although,
the AU  has  imposed  sanctions  on Member  States  in cases
132 See Article 23:2 Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11 July 2000 (hereafter, Constitutive Act
of the AU).
133 See  African  Union.  The African  Union  Convention  on Cyber  Security  and  Personal  Data
Protection, 27 June, 2014 (EX.CL/846 (XXV).
134 See Magliveras, K. D. (2011)  The Sanctioning System of the African Union: Part Success,
Part  Failure?, The African  Union:  The First  Ten  Years.  11–13 October  2011.  Addis  Ababa:
Institute of Security Studies, pp. 1–33. 
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of the unconstitutional  overthrow  of governments135 and  non-payment
of membership contributions,136 however, it appears that sanctions have not
been imposed on the authority of Article 23:2 of the AU Constitutive Act.137 
6. CHALLENGES IMPEDING THE CONVENTION 
AS A FRAMEWORK FOR REGIONAL CYBER STABILITY
There are several challenges that impede the application of the obligations
under  the AU  Cybersecurity  Convention  for  the purpose  of promoting
regional  cyber  stability.  These  challenges  include  the absence  of capacity
in terms  of expert  personnel  that  will  facilitate  the development  and
implementation  of national  policy  and  regulatory  frameworks  for
cybersecurity governance, and the administration of national cybersecurity
agencies  and  CERTs.138 There  are  also  peculiar  challenges  arising  from
the absence  of requisite  institutional  capacities  in terms  of cybersecurity
governance  and  cybercrime  law  enforcement.  For  example,  law
enforcement authorities in many African States still lack capacities to detect,
investigate and prosecute cybercrime.139 Although there have been various
initiatives to build capacities in law enforcement authorities in some States,
it  however,  appears  that  such  initiatives  to a large  extent  have  not  yet
achieved  the intended  results.  Weak  institutional  capacity  is  reflected
in terms  of lack  of up  to date  technological  tools  to enhance  law
enforcement  and lack  of awareness  amongst  law  enforcement  officials.140
Another  indicator  of weak  institutional  capacities  is  the absence
of functional  national  CERTs  and  national  cybersecurity  agencies  and
to coordinate responses to cybersecurity threats in most African States. 141
The challenge  of weak  institutional  capacities  can  also  be  traced
to the poor funding of cybersecurity governance initiatives.142 Poor funding
135 See  Mkhize,  S.  (2014)  Assessing  the Efficacy  of the AU  Sanctions  Policies  with  Regard
to Unconstitutional  Changes  in Government:  The Examples  of Guinea  and  Madagascar.  M.A.
University of South Africa, pp. 67–118.
136 See Magliveras K. D. (2011), id. pp. 1–33. 
137 Id. pp. 8–9.
138 See African Union and Symantec Corporation (2006)  Cyber Crime & Cyber Security Trends
in Africa. United States: Symantec Corporation, pp. 60, 61, 63, 66, 70, and 83.
139 Id. pp. 70, 83, 134.
140 See n. 138, p. 10.
141 See Solutions Consulting (2018) West Africa Cybersecurity Indexing and Readiness Assessment.
United States: Solutions Consulting, p. 37.
142 See African Union and Symantec Corporation (2016)  Cyber Crime & Cyber Security Trends
in Africa.  United  States:  Symantec  Corporation,  pp. 70,  76,  88,  89,  and  92.  See  Serianu
Limited (2016) Africa Cybersecurity Report 2016. Kenya: Serianu Limited, p. 46.
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of cybersecurity  initiatives  has  been  responsible  for  the absence  of expert
personnel  that  would  facilitate  the development  and  implementation
of national policy and regulatory frameworks for cybersecurity governance
and also assist law enforcement authorities in the prevention, investigation
or prosecution of cybercrime. In addition, poor funding has limited research
and  development  initiatives  that  would  promote  regional  cybersecurity
governance  within  the AU.  To some  extent,  the poor  funding
of cybersecurity  initiatives  by African  governments  has  been  caused
by the fact that cybersecurity is not really considered as a national security
priority in many African States. This is also not unconnected with the fact
many  African  States  face  physical  national  security  challenges  such
as terrorism  which  policy  makers  usually  consider  more  pervasive  than
cybercrime and other cybersecurity challenges.143
Another  major  challenge  that  has  hindered  the application
of the Convention’s  obligations  as a framework  for  promoting  regional
cyber stability is the slow pace that has characterized both the signing and
ratification  of the Convention  by Member  States,  and  the development
of national policy and regulatory frameworks for cybersecurity governance
in many Member  States.  To some extent,  the challenge  of slow responses
appears  to characterize  the development  of ICT  regulatory  initiatives
in Africa.144 The slow pace of responses  can be traced to factors including
lack  of awareness  amongst  policy  makers  and  legislators  in Member
States,145 which may have resulted from factors such as the lack of a broad
consultation of key stakeholders that drive policy and legislative processes
in Member States during the development of the Convention.146 This is also
compounded  by lack  of capacity  in terms  of expert  personnel  to drive
143 See  Shuaibu,  M.  and  Bernsah,  L.D.  (2016)  An Analysis  of the Macroeconomic  Impact
of Insecurity on Nigeria: A Dynamic Modeling Approach.  Journal of Social and Management
Sciences, 2 (1), pp. 3, 4, 6. See Ploch, L. (2010) Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S.
Response.  Congressional  Research  Service,  R41473,  p. 19.  See  Vanguard  (2017)  Federal
Government  Committing  Significant  Share  of 2017  Budget  to North-East –  Onyeama.  [online]
Vanguard. Available from: https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/02/fgcommittingsignificant
-share-2017-budget-northeast-onyeama/ [Accessed 6 June 2018].
144 See UNTCAD (2012) Harmonizing Cyberlaw and Regulations: The Experience of the East African
Community. New York/Geneva: UNCTAD, pp. 8–9.
145 See  Seck,  M.  (2014)  Tackling  the Challenges  of Cybersecurity  in Africa.  United  Nations
Economic  Commission  for  Africa  Policy  Brief,  NTIS/002/2014,  p. 4.  [online]  Available  from:
https:///www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/ntis_policy_brief_1.pdf
[Accessed 6 June 2018]. See Serianu Limited (2016)  Africa Cybersecurity Report 2016. Kenya:
Serianu  Limited,  pp. 21–22.  See  Links  F.  (2018)  Tackling  Cyber  Security/Crime
in Namibia – Calling for a Human Rights Respecting Framework. Democracy Report – Special
Briefing Report, 20, p. 4.
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the development of national cybersecurity governance frameworks147 which
then  results  in much  reliance  on technical  assistance  from  international
organizations148 and their  consultants.149 In practice,  however,  a country’s
request for such technical assistance from an international organization may
not  be  timely,  which  further  contributes  in slowing  down  the pace
of developing national policy and regulatory frameworks for cybersecurity
governance  in Member  States  that  request  assistance.  National  budget
constraints  also  impede  the timely  development  of national  cybersecurity
policy  and  regulatory  frameworks  in many  Member  States  who  are
challenged by other development concerns which are considered priority
areas that require increased government funding such as curbing the spread
of HIV/AIDS, tackling widespread poverty, and promoting the sustainable
exploitation of natural resources.150
The slow  pace  of responses  can  further  be  traced  to the absence
of a dedicated  and effective  regional  institutional  governance  mechanism
that  would  promote  the ratification  of the Convention  by Member  States
and also monitor and facilitate the development of national cybersecurity
governance  frameworks.  This  state  of affairs  appears  to be  resulting
in a poor  regional  coordination  and  harmonization  of cybersecurity
frameworks,  while  also  limiting  prospects  for  regional  cybersecurity
cooperation  and the dissemination  of best  practices.  In addition,  the large
size of the AU with its  55 Member States and their  diverse national  legal
traditions, and how they receive and implement international treaties is also
a major  challenge  to the effective  application  of the Convention
146 See  Open Forum to Discuss  the Proposed Legal  Framework for  Cybersecurity  in Africa.
(26 July 2013) [online] Available from: http://daucc.wordpress.com/2013/07/26/event-panel-
discussion-on-the-draft-african-union-cyber-security-convention/#comment-4  [Accessed
6 June 2018].
147 See  Bertelsmann-Scott,  T.  (2013)  Regional  Cooperation  in the Telecommunications  Sector
via CRASA. PERISA Series, p. 3.
148 A study by the United  Nations  Office  on Drugs  and  Crime (UNODC)  indicates  that  all
African States that responded to its questionnaire, requested technical assistance to build
the capacities of law enforcement, prosecution and court authorities to prevent and combat
cybercrime. See UNODC (2013) Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime. New York: United
Nations, p. 178.
149 See  Calandro,  E. S.  Regionalism  and  the Development  of the Information  Society:  Policy
Considerations  from  SADC,  p. 10.  [online].  Available  from  http://www.cprsouth.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/CPRsouth2015_PP115FINAL_vReviewed.pdf  [Accessed  6 June
2018].
150 See  Orji,  U. J.  (2018)  International  Telecommunications  Law  and  Policy.  United  Kingdom:
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, p. 369. See also, African Union and Symantec Corporation
(2016)  Cyber Crime & Cyber Security Trends in Africa. United States: Symantec Corporation,
p. 60.
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as a framework  for  promoting  regional  cyber  stability  and  harmonizing
cybersecurity governance measures in Member States.
7. RECOMMENDATIONS
Article 32  of the AU  Cybersecurity  Convention  provides  for
the establishment  of a monitoring  and  operational  mechanism  for
the purpose  of implementing  the Convention.  The responsibilities
of the Convention’s operational mechanism include:
(a)  promoting  the adoption  and  implementation  of measures
to strengthen  cybersecurity  in electronic  services  and  combating
cybercrime and human right violations in cyberspace; and
(b)  advising  African  governments  on measures  to promote
cybersecurity  and  combat  cybercrime  and  human  right  violations
in cyberspace at the national level.151
The Convention’s  regional  monitoring  mechanism  has  not  yet  being
formally  established.  However,  the above  mandates  under  Article  32
of the Convention may be broadly interpreted to create a regional network
agency  that  is  similar  to the European  Information  Security  Agency
(ENISA).152 The ENISA  was  established  in 2004  by the European
Commission153 to promote  cyber  security  and  critical  information
infrastructure  protection.  The Agency  serves  as a center  of excellence  for
Member  States  of the European  Union  and  European  institutions
on cybersecurity  issues.  Its  responsibilities  include  providing  advice  and
recommendations on cybersecurity and disseminating information on best
practices.154 Given  that  the slow  pace  which  has  characterized  both
the signing  and  ratification  of the Convention  by Member  States  and
the development of national cybersecurity governance frameworks in many
AU  Member  States  can  also  be  traced  to the absence  of a dedicated  and
effective regional institutional governance mechanism that would promote
the ratification  of the Convention  by Member  States  and  also  monitor
151 See Article 32 AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection.
152 See Orji, U. J. (2015) Multilateral Legal Responses to Cybersecurity in Africa: Any Hope for
Effective International Cooperation? In: Maybaum, M. et al. (eds.) Architectures in Cyberspace
- 7th International Conference on Cyber Conflict. Tallinn: NATO CCD COE, p. 116.
153 See Regulation establishing the European Network and Information Security Agency (EC
No 460/2004).
154 See ENISA (2018) Available from: http://www.enisa.europa.eu/ [Accessed 6 June 2018].
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the development  of national  cybersecurity  governance  frameworks,  it
appears imperative for the AU to formally set up the regional monitoring
mechanism  established  under  Article 32  of the Convention.  This  is  also
necessary in order to improve the regional coordination and harmonization
of cybersecurity  governance  frameworks,  while  also  increasing  prospects
for  regional  cybersecurity  cooperation  and  the dissemination  of best
practices.  Such  a measure  would  go  a long  way  towards  harnessing
the application  of the Convention  as a framework  for  promoting  regional
cyber stability. In addition, it is imperative for African States to take other
measures such as:  promoting cybersecurity governance as a core regional
security priority; improving the funding of cybersecurity capacity building
initiatives  to enhance  the development  of a pool  of skilled  personnel;
promoting  awareness  amongst  policy  makers  and  legislators;  and,
improving  funding  for  national  cybersecurity  initiatives  including
the operation of National CERTs/CSIRTS and law enforcement institutions.
8. CONCLUSION
Africa  still  lacks  efficient  capacities  and  resources  for  cybersecurity
governance. This absence of capacities and resources remains a major factor
that  has  contributed  to creating  an enabling  environment  for  rising
cybercrime  trends  in African  States.155 The adoption  of the AU
Cybersecurity  Convention  indicates  Africa’s  awareness  of cybersecurity
concerns and also signals  its  interest  in promoting cyber stability  at least
from a regional perspective. However, while there is no doubt that the AU
Cybersecurity  Convention  seeks  to promote  regional  cyber  stability,
the achievement  of this  objective  is  dependent  on the timely
implementation  obligations  that  arise  from  the Convention,  as well
as on the ability  of the AU  to coordinate  and  monitor  its  implementation
by Member States. In order to achieve such desired outcomes, the AU and
its  Member  States  may  have  to consider  taking  timely  steps  towards
addressing  the highlighted  challenges  that  impede  the application
of the Convention as a framework for promoting regional cyber stability.
155 See Flores, R. et al. (2017) Cybercrime in West Africa: Poised for an Underground Market. United
States: Trend Micro and INTERPOL, p. 3. See also, Kharouni. L. (2013)  Africa: A New Safe
Harbour for Cyber Criminals? Trend Micro Research Paper. United States: Trend Micro Inc.
pp. 1–26.
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